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This is a deeply learned historical account of the classical Chinese language over
the six hundred years after the time of Confucius, and of logical reasoning, im-
plicit and explicit, through the seventh century A.D. The author notes at the out-
set that the book is "almost entirely concerned not with the history of science,
but with the comparative history of the foundations of science." To put it more
accurately, the author has much to say about the history of science, but does not
consult its primary sources. By "the foundations" he mainly means grammar and
logic (p. xxiv). The volume's many consequential findings and some of its limi-
tations will interest readers of East Asian Science, Technology, and Medicine.
* * *
This survey of topics is largely comparative. It applies scholarship on several
cultures, but is mainly based on the author's own study of Greek, Latin, Chinese
and, to a smaller extent, Sanskrit texts. The volume takes up a series of questions
about classical Chinese on which Sinologists have expressed greatly divergent
but usually quite firm opinions. Let me give a few examples to show why the
author's answers are often persuasive.
Can we find a single underlying logic in all cultures, or is each unique? Al-
though ancient Chinese ways of "articulating and structuring thought" are "pro-
foundly different" from European ones in ways that Harbsmeier sets out clearly,
Aristotelians and Confucians use the same types of logical tools—negations,
conditionals, quantifiers, and so on.
Does Chinese lack the linguistic tools needed to define classes? The author
demonstrates to the contrary that categorical thought was highly developed (pp.
218-229). All four Aristotelian subject-predicate relations are normal in China;
the absence of "the categorical syllogism" can only be due to a disinclination to
use those relations in that way (p. 121). Chinese skillfully constructed explicit
122 EASTM 17 (2000)
logical arguments that are valid from the modern point of view (p. 261). Even in
legal documents of the third century B.C. we find true term variables (chia, yi 
, etc., like A and B), useful for articulating generalizations, and usually consid-
ered an Aristotelian invention (pp. 287-288). The author makes it clear that Chi-
nese did not adapt these variables to philosophical reasoning, but shows no sign
of awareness that they appear (along with even more elaborate forms) in scien-
tific publications. Although logic was less important than in the Greek world,
"the art of plausible reasoning" became a regular part of Chinese intellectual life
(p. 265).
Was Hegel correct that ancient Chinese "lack the free space of inner reflec-
tion" and were incapable of "a non-empirical, abstract, and theoretical Science
with a purely philosophical and cognitive perspective"? Harbsmeier cannot fully
answer Hegel's tendentious question, which would require looking at scientific
evidence, but he clears the air by questioning whether the West ever developed
such a science (p. 25, n. 2). One need only add that European scientists deci-
sively rejected that ideal well before Hegel's time.
Is it a fact that any Chinese word can serve as any part of speech, as frus-
trated novices often suspect? No, some are quite specific. The language, despite
its flexibility, incorporates tendencies for words to play certain functional roles
(pp. 134-138). Early Chinese tend to think of meanings not as absolute, but in
relation to a particular writer's use of the word in a given context. But there are
significant exceptions, not only the elegant and capacious definitions in the Mo-
hist dialectical writings studied by A. C. Graham, but the extensive glossary of
ethical terms in the Hsin shu   of Chia I   (early second century B.C.),
here partly translated for the first time (pp. 60-62). Harbsmeier intriguingly adds
that Elizabethan English, rather like Chinese, thrived on "categorical grammati-
cal anarchy"; the rigidity of modern English seems to accompany a decline in its
"expressive power and vivacity" (p. 124-127).
The truth of sentences has indeed been a consistent Chinese concern. But
thinkers "have not tended to reify or hypostasise an abstract concept of truth as
correspondence with facts" in the Greek style, or for that matter to reify any ab-
stract concept (a matter that the author sees as "commendable," p. 195). On the
other hand, abstraction is not at all unusual in China, as anyone who has encoun-
tered the Five Phases knows; but it "tends to be introduced only where it is es-
sential to convey a message," rather than being, as in Europe, "a preferred stylis-
tic device" (p. 234). Again it would have been helpful to add that some kinds of
technical literature prefer abstraction.
Then there is the big question of whether the Chinese language was in some
sense unsuited to express evolving scientific theory, a position frequently as-
serted over more than a century (invariably by people who had never read a
scientific monograph). This question was long since laid to rest by historians of
science in China and elsewhere, who have shown how rich ancient theory was.
We have tossed out the parochial assumption that Chinese tried and failed to
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develop in the direction of modern science, and have reoriented our attention to
what they did aim to do.
The author, approaching the same question of language and science from the
philological angle, finds many concrete, significant differences between Greek
and Chinese. The latter tends less often to indulge in rhetorical and syntactic
complexity. Greece and India are logocentric, concerned with the meaning and
truth of assertions; Chinese focus instead "on what people really intended to
convey by using these words." The important Chinese argument type that chains
together a sequence of statements in the form "When A then (tse ) B, . . . when
E then F" to show that F follows from A does have a logical base, Harbsmeier
demonstrates (pp. 280-282). Unlike the equally pervasive Greek syllogism, its
concern is not strict logical implication but "regular concomitance" (thus "when"
rather than "if"). In probing basic differences between Greek, Latin, and Chi-
nese, Harbsmeier intriguingly compares Plato's Protagoras in a 1933 Chinese
translation with the Jowett translation into English. He concludes, not surpris-
ingly, that texts of this kind pose more difficulties, "syntactic and grammatical,"
for classical Chinese than for modern English (pp. 166-171; for an analogous
study from a different point of view, see Robert Wardy's new Aristotle in China
in the Needham Research Institute Studies series).
A large part of the volume is devoted to a survey of logic as its forms are im-
plicit in philosophic writings, and as Chinese discussed it explicitly. This con-
spectus is an improvement on what the histories of Chinese philosophy have to
say about the subject. The author has some analyses of early paradoxes, and
reconstructs Kung-sun Lung's    legendarily vexatious "a white house is
not a horse" dialogue, eschewing Graham's ingenious reconstruction and trans-
lating the received text with only a couple of emendations. This is possible be-
cause Harbsmeier discards the usual assumption that Kung-sun was a brilliant
and coherent theoretician "advancing one consecutive logical demonstration" for
a view of him as a sophist with "a somewhat flippant interest in argumentation
for the purpose of creating entertaining puzzles" (pp. 298-311).
Harbsmeier pauses to berate the oft-execrated Chad Hansen for his notorious
hypothesis which concludes from Kung-sun's dialogue that ma  (horse) in par-
ticular and Chinese substantives in general are "mass nouns." That is, they stand
not for individual things that can be counted but for a single stuff like water,
scattered through time and space, that can only be measured (thus, among other
things, the measure words used with nouns). Hansen has long since been con-
futed, which leaves outside observers wondering why Sinologists keep slapping
him down.
On the whole I share Graham's enthusiasm for Hansen's challenge as, al-
though fallacious, a breath of fresh air in a stodgy field. Harbsmeier includes in a
long enumeration of actual mass nouns the "five ch'i" and "six ch'i" (wu-ch'i, liu-
ch'i    ; pp. 311-321). That, he does not note, is precisely Hansen's tri-
umph and failure. The notion of the mass noun, however wrong for horses,
makes possible a powerful account of ch'i as the backbone of Han cosmology
124 EASTM 17 (2000)
and physical thought. This Hansen failed to realize, because like many Sinolo-
gists he is in thrall to the Awesome Taboo. This stupendous prohibition rules
out, under penalties so hideous that no one has even imagined them, reading,
under any circumstances whatever, any primary monograph on science, technol-
ogy, or medicine. Hansen might still rise to the acclaim that surely awaits a mass
noun study of ch'i, but so far the Awesome Taboo has made it unthinkable.
Harbsmeier proceeds to discuss naming in the Hsun-tzu  , and then the
logical and epistemological propositions in the Mohist dialectical writings. He
points out that the aim of the Mohists' "logical analysis" (one of his translations
for pien ) is "the fitting description of the world" (p. 329). The same, he con-
cludes, is true of the writings of Wang Pi   and two other authors of the
third century A.D. In all of these analyses, calling their subject "semantics" (the
analysis of relationships between words and their meaning) rather than "logic"
(which encompasses the whole art of reasoning) would have made the discussion
of pre-Buddhist logic tighter.
The crown of this section—in fact of the book as a whole—is the author's
own extensive study of Buddhist logic (yin-ming  ), a set of practices that
Chinese adapted, with considerable originality, from non-Buddhist sources in
India. Harbsmeier makes a case that T'ang Chinese was quite precise and subtle
enough to express this art's sophistication; in fact often the muddles in these
writings are those of their Sanskrit sources. He replies to Nakamura Hajime's
disdain for the fallacies in the Buddhist writings with a reminder that Plato's
works are also "a happy hunting ground indeed for those who delight in logical
blunders" (p. 368).
This Buddhist art amounts to "rigid formal logical analysis." On the other
hand, the conclusion that it is "ultimately concerned not with formal logical
validity, but with material truth" leaves the reader hungering to be told plainly
whether it too is consistently a matter of semantics (p. 372). Unlike the syllo-
gism, in the yin-ming propositions the conclusion comes first. It is actually "an
art of formally justifying a thesis or tenet." Buddhists saw their logic as "the
science of rules and conventions governing argumentation as a social institution
. . . essentially 'rhetorical' . . . a tool for religious insight" (pp. 370, 408). It is
significant that in China only "part of a small subculture" took up this pursuit,
although in India as in the West "logicians belonged to the mainstream of intel-
lectual endeavor" (p. 7).
Harbsmeier closes the book with some interesting reflections. Many are
about "science," but he often uses this word idiosyncratically. What he refers to
most often with it is logic and philology. He treats it like French science and
German Wissenschaft, which are broad enough to include grammar, history,
literary criticism, and much else. Speakers of English rejected this amplitude
nearly two centuries ago.
The author also notes enigmatically that "the detailed impact of Chinese ap-
proaches to and experiences of logic on the practice of concrete sciences . . . will
be treated in a separate volume by another author" (p. xxiv). What makes this
125 Reviews
enigmatic is, first, that this volume often does generalize about that impact and,
second, that there is no such fascicule among the few still to be published in this
series. Such a plan may well have been among the many discussed at various
times, but long before this book went to press, it was clear to everyone involved
in Joseph Needham's project that this would be the only volume consecrated to
language and logic.
The idiosyncratic usage of "science" does not always make the author's re-
marks less interesting, as when he notes that China provides "the only example
that is known to us of a non-Indo-European tradition of scientific inquiry into
language" (p. 409). But then the subsection on rhetoric and science identifies as
"constraints upon scientific discourse" the lack of expressions that correspond to
"that is to say" and "so to speak" (p. 412). Unaccompanied by evidence of con-
straint from scientific sources, but obviously not referring to constraints upon
discussion of grammar and logic, this proposition is an example of the confusion
that Harbsmeier's usage encourages.
The discussion of "reasoning in science" is given over to upbraiding Jean-
Claude Martzloff, although his outstanding history of Chinese mathematics duly
acknowledges that "the question of logic is the most fundamental question that
there is." But Martzloff's choosing in his brief chapter to survey half a dozen
varied modes of reasoning rather than, as Harbsmeier would prefer, to "present
important methods of proof or logically significant presentation," makes it "in-
tensely disappointing" (p. 413).
Here as throughout the book Harbsmeier's criteria of importance are those of
the philologist and student of logic. They sometimes generate needless perplexi-
ties, as when he wonders why historians of science have not given Buddhist
logic the attention it deserves. But he has already answered the question. First,
he asserts that in order to study yin-ming seriously one must know Chinese,
Japanese, Sanskrit, and Tibetan. The author himself does not cite Tibetan
sources. Second, he admits that yin-ming did "not catch on even among Chinese
Buddhists, not to speak of Chinese thinkers within other traditions" (pp. 367,
414).
For another example, he notices that pre-Buddhist Chinese authors seldom
transcribe conversations; the polished classical formulations give only "the up-
shot of thought and speech." This "absence of extended inner dialogue," he tells
us, affected considerably "the logical form of scientific writing," giving rise to "a
profound difference in logical and scientific style between China and Europe."
The result was good for the history of technology because it benefitted "the user
of any mathematical theorems or procedures," but its success ended when "fur-
ther progress in technology depended no longer on discoveries about numbers,
physical objects and the like" (pp. 415-419).
Whatever this may be about, it is not about Chinese technology. A glance at
technological documents (or at previous volumes in this series) reveals that
manufacture and construction did not depend on mathematical theorems. It is
also not about science, for anyone who has browsed in the European literature
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will realize that there is next to no verbatim speech in its technical treatises. Phi-
losophers and historians of science distinguish the "logic of discovery" from the
"logic of justification," and find since the seventeenth century a consistent dis-
junction between how occidental scientists have made discoveries and how they
have presented them. An exact, conversational account of a process of discovery
would seldom have been accepted as a scientific paper from 1650 on. It is hard
to draw any simple conclusion about the significance of Chinese "scribal
reticence" from this complex picture.
The book ends with a most curious warning about "Political Correctness"
(pp. 419-420). Harbsmeier finds that "the unperceived and therefore all the more
powerful obligatory paradigms of scientific discourse on intellectual history"
often crowd out "unflinching" analysis. That incomprehensible circumstance
poses a particular danger in the "highly 'politicised' and sensitive area" of com-
parative studies because they aim "to promote respect for other civilisations."
Now that China is "emphatically on the world map of the history of science and
of intellectual history," it is time, he cautions us, that scholars "no longer remain
advocates for the case of China," and instead "become fair judges of the relative
strengths and weaknesses of the Chinese intellectual tradition." This is as vague
as most imputations of "political correctness" about what evils it is unmasking.
I for one cannot make head or tail of this advice. I have been engaged for ten
solid years in a project that compares the emergence of cosmology, science and
medicine in ancient Greece and China. Never momentarily has my collaborator
or I even imagined that pronouncing on either culture's strengths and weaknesses
might have any useful role to play in our conclusions. Harbsmeier's highly judg-
mental attitude toward primary sources leads to a number of provocative inter-
pretations for grammar, but I am delighted not to be compelled to adopt it for the
study of thought.
* * *
This is on the whole a fine history of language and logic, which everyone who
prepares graduate students for a life of research will find useful. In addition to
the author's deep learning, his love and enthusiasm for language are likely to
inspire them. It is problematic, however, in several ways that make it less trust-
worthy than it might have been.
First is the book's narrowness of vision. Although it refers to its subject as
"the concept of scientific truth" (p. 207), it betrays no interest at all in what the
scientific sources of its period have to say about truth and related matters. Its
discussion of truth is based on the warhorses of Chinese philosophy, ignoring
sources of the first importance for Han cosmology such as Yang Hsiung's  
T'ai hsuan ching   . The analyses are, with the rarest exceptions, limited
to the viewpoints of philology and logic, with a welcome smidgeon of
epistemology. It is largely (but not always) positivistic, looking at Chinese texts
for "sound recognizable logic" (p. 279). At a couple of points the author recog-
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nizes that "there is something profoundly unsatisfactory in this method" (pp. 7,
273). At another he wistfully agrees with Graham that instead "we should . . .
allow ourselves the luxury of investigating as closely as we can exactly what did
develop, and under what internal and external intellectual conditions" (p. 415).
Although the author does that nicely here and there, for instance in a discussion
of the large role of historical allusion in argument, that is not the thrust of the
book. And despite the concluding reflections on topics that involve science and
technology, what did develop in mathematics, physical science, engineering and
medicine rests totally unexamined.
Second, the book seems in some respects to be out of date, beyond the fact
that it was drafted by 1988. The author's linguistics, like that of most Sinologists,
is the linguistics of the 1960's and 1970's. It is nostalgic to find an expert exer-
cised over whether a given word is "'primarily' or 'basically' an intransitive verb
or an adjective" (p. 138). Having found how greatly transformational linguistics
simplifies the teaching of particles, I wonder what breakthroughs it might have
yielded in the hands of a Harbsmeier (or a Pulleyblank, or a Cikoski; they also
stayed a generation behind the cutting edge, which after all has moved beyond
Chomsky).
Although the author is aware of sociolinguistics—at one point he defines
"the anthropology of logic" (p. 414)—he does not practice it. His very
occasional observations on social context enhance his explanations. Still, he
usually treats documents in the old style, as authoritative texts rather than as
assertions that one can fully understand only when the author's social and
political ideals and circumstances are clear. A purely social analysis, of course,
would be no more adequate than a purely philological one; the most illuminating
historical studies demonstrate the unity of what goes on inside people's heads
and their involvement in what goes on around them.
The author, in the style of an earlier generation, also uses generously,
without specifying what he means by them, highly ambiguous terms such as "the
Legalists" and "the Taoists." Scholars have regularly challenged their value as
designations of real collectivities, and historical writing has generally turned out
to be clearer without them. In this fascicule the first category, for instance,
includes Shen Pu-hai   , who H. G. Creel argued in detail had nothing to
do with those whom historians in the 1970's were calling Legalists, as well as
Han Fei  , one of whose chapters becomes, in another part of this book,
"Taoist theorising." Sometimes "the Taoists" are the Lao-tzu   and Chuang-
tzu  , sometimes the Huai-nan-tzu   , which most experts today
would consider highly eclectic (it quotes the Lü shih ch'un-ch'iu    
more often than the Lao-tzu). But when Harbsmeier writes forthrightly of "the
Taoists, who contributed most to the progress of science through the ages," he
can hardly mean any of these. Then again, when he notes that "the Taoists"
would "certainly" have argued that the opposing sides in any argument are both
wrong, he cannot be referring to the contributors to science (pp. 53-54, 350, 238,
254, 331). The overwhelming majority of the latter, it has long been clear, were
128 EASTM 17 (2000)
philosophically conventional gentlemen, often officials (for detailed evidence
see my "Taoism and Science," 1995, not in the bibliography).
Sometimes "the Taoists" are artifacts of misunderstanding, as in " . . . the
Prince of Huai Nan in his study of Taoism assembled all the Taoists of the em-
pire and humbled the grandeur of a princedom before the expositors of Taoist
lore" (p. 278). What the Lun Heng   actually says is Huai-nan wang hsueh
tao, chao hui t'ien-hsia yu tao chih jen. Ch'ing i-kuo chih tsun, hsia tao-shu chih
shih                        
  (Lau concordance ed., 24/95/7-9). This passage contains not a single ism. I
would translate it more literally as "the king [one level below an emperor] of
Huai-nan, when studying the Way, summoned possessors of ways from
[throughout] the empire. He squandered the honor due [the ruler of] a state to
humble himself before retainers who had [learned] the techniques of a way."
There is nothing Taoist about striving to attain the Way, which was what Confu-
cius and his successors, among many of diverse persuasions, did. The ways that
the king's retainers possessed, in the ordinary usage of the time, could be techni-
cal skills at anything from assassination to immortality.
Third, the author often takes the translations in this book from his predeces-
sors (in this instance, from the 1907 translation of Alfred Forke). Often he does
not correct the old ones that need it, and at other times improves them when
there are good reasons not to do so. Let me give a couple of examples from his
use of A. C. Graham's translations, the first from the Mohist dialectical writings
and the second from Mencius.
Graham translates the Canon (6B/4) Hsing hsiu i chiu. Shuo tsai ch'ien-hou
         "Travelling over a distance implies duration. Ex-
plained by: at first and afterwards." Harbsmeier's "Moving over a spatial exten-
sion uses a temporal extension" introduces, with no textual basis, the second-
order abstract notion of extension. He thus misleadingly but clearly implies that
the Mohists thought of distance and time as simply different kinds of extension.
As he does so, he admits "we do not know exactly what paradoxes or paradox
the Mohists had in mind"! He also rejects Graham's "implies" in order to inter-
ject a physical interpretation that I for one cannot comprehend, namely that
moving over one extension "uses" another. Then, when he proceeds to the Inter-
pretation, his English, "the mover is necessarily closer at first and further away
only after that," implies not spatial extension but locations at different dis-
tances—exactly the point that Graham's lucid explanation makes in terms remi-
niscent of Zeno (p. 344).
Mencius has an interesting discussion of ku, , the appeal to the past that
distracts rulers from sagehood (4B/26). It concludes with a homily about the sky:
T'ien chih kao yeh, hsing-ch'en chih yuan yeh, kou ch'iu ch'i ku, ch'ien sui chih
jih-chih k'o tso erh chih yeh                 
        . Graham in "a very important detailed discussion of
this passage" translates ku throughout as "how X was before," and almost does
justice to this passage with "Although the sky is so high and the stars so distant,
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if we seek out how they were before, we can calculate a solstice a thousand years
ahead without rising from our seats." Despite his professed admiration for Gra-
ham's handling of this text, Harbsmeier discards this interpretation for an incon-
sistent and positivistic one. He asserts that "even the traditionalist Confucian
Mêng Tzu recognised the importance of objective causes or reasons (ku ),"
and translates accordingly: " . . . if one seeks out the (real) reasons (ku), one can
calculate the solstices of a thousand years hence without stirring from one's
seat." He understands two occurrences of ku earlier in the same passage, how-
ever, not as objective reasons but as clever, by which he implies specious, ones.
I find no instance in the Warring States era of ku as objective causes. I note
that the great philosophical and astronomical author of the late Ming, Huang
Tsung-hsi   , understood the word as Graham later did. He named a book
of his own (on the computational techniques underlying the great astronomical
treatise of 1279) Shou-shih li ku     (The Season-granting System as it
was before, i.e., restored to its original state). In short, Mencius' text does not
support Harbsmeier's inference that "Mêng Tzu . . . recommends a scientific
observation of realities also in non-'scientific' contexts" (pp. 275-276).
At the same time, Harbsmeier perpetuates two misinterpretations in Graham's
translation. Chih does not mean "calculate," and nothing in the text specifies or
even suggests future solstices. What the text says has nothing to do with mathe-
matical astronomy: "if we seek how they were before, as we sit there we can call
before us [i.e., imagine] the winter solstices of a thousand years."
A final curious instance is a medical passage from Tso chuan   (Duke Chao,
year 1), which ends: Nü, yang wu, erh hui shih, yin tse sheng nei je huo ku chih
chi                 . Harbsmeier fails to
say that he reproduces Graham's translation of the whole item, with a few altera-
tions that do not better it. For this sentence Graham has "woman being a thing of
the sunshine but of the dark time, in excess she generates the diseases of inward
heat and deluding poisons." Harbsmeier "corrects" the first half to "woman being
a thing of yang but of a dark season," without explaining what "a dark season"
might mean, and leaves the second half unaltered even though a poison can
scarcely be a disease (p. 263).
Graham is right that in Tso chuan, yin and yang are still concrete, not yet yin-
yang. "Sunshine" is unexceptionable. Both scholars are mistaken in reading huo
and ku as a compound, as a moment with any standard reference book on early
disease nomenclature would have revealed. I cannot agree with either interpreta-
tion of erh without persuasive evidence that it joined nouns before the Han; if it
did, the phrase would be asserting that "woman" is a dark time, not of it. I there-
fore see no alternative to reading the shih after erh as what we call hereabouts a
stative verb, meaning "to be timely, to occur at the proper time" (Han-yü ta tz'u-
tien, sense 7). That makes a more defensible translation, still subject to correc-
tion with regard to shih, as "Women are things of sunshine, but darkness is the
proper time [for sexual intercourse]. When it [copulation, not she] becomes
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lewd, that gives rise to internal hot disorders, mental confusion, and demonic
infestations."
Fourth, there is much more carelessness in quotation, writing, and documen-
tation than is usual in this series. Some quotations from Chinese do not make
sense in English, for instance Mencius asking Tai Pu-sheng "do you wish your
kind to be good?" The Chinese is about a king, not a kind, and a sentence is
omitted from the translation of this passage without any indication (3B/6, p. 51).
There is obviously something wrong with "if you hear that something you do not
know is like something you do not know, then . . . you know them both." There
is nothing in the Chinese corresponding to the second "not" (p. 115). The writing
is frequently quite verbose; in addition to examples above, we are told that Con-
fucius "was interested in language within the context of the political and social
context of his time" (p. 52). A number of sources cited in the book do not appear
in the bibliography, including, to return to Graham, his publication of 1980
(cited pp. 101, 105).
* * *
Finally there is the question of science and civilization. I have already mentioned
that the author uses "science" idiosyncratically, encouraging confusion among
readers accustomed to the word's normal English usage. But a still more serious
problem grows out of this one.
This volume would have become the standard monograph on its subject, I
believe, if it had completely rather than halfway avoided science. The presence
of the word in the series title does not dictate that the author extrapolate from his
mastery of language to draw what turn out to be distinctly odd conclusions for
the history of science. But he does so again and again.
The root problem is that the author is not interested in the history of science,
that his finely honed curiosity does not extend to the exploration of its sources,
and that his notion of its problems and methods are closer to those of the 1950's
than to current practice in that field (which differs greatly from current practice
in Sinology). Nevertheless he freely dispenses judgments about science and its
history.
Let me give two examples. In his section on language and science the author
tells us that "the graphological analysis of Chinese characters" in the Shuo wen
chieh tzu     dictionary (A.D. 100 or a little later), exemplified "rigid
scientific methodology and systematic classification for natural scientists of later
ages" (p. 409, my emphasis). With respect to science, this rigid methodology is a
phantom, not only in China but in other civilizations.
A significant breakthrough in the history of science after the 1950's was dis-
carding the myth of "the scientific method." Spokesmen such as Galileo and
Descartes took their case to patricians outside the Church and its universities in
order to carve out a space for their antischolastic enterprise. Their arguments that
a fixed method gave science a power denied to other modes of thought im-
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pressed many influential laymen. But idealized sequences of hypothetico-deduc-
tive steps never, in the seventeenth century or in the twentieth, reflected the un-
predictable way research actually leads to results. In the year 2000 the secondary
schools still teach "the scientific method," university students still unlearn it as
they learn to do science, and working scientists still scoff at its naiveté. Histo-
rians understand it, in other words, as a figment of the logic of justification dis-
guised, for the purpose of public relations, as the logic of discovery. Of course
this does not tell us whether there was a rigid methodology in early Chinese
alchemy or astronomy. That is an empirical question which the author does not
raise.
The section on rhetoric and science (pp. 411-412) is even odder. In addition
to the judgment about "constraints upon scientific discourse" mentioned above,
it is largely taken up by a "folkloristic biography" of a "legendary carpenter"
whom Harbsmeier nevertheless flatly asserts was born in 507 B.C. The long
quotation is provided with no reference to the original source. The author simply
says that it comes from the Lu Pan ching (no characters in the text, no listing in
the bibliography). It turns out to be copied word for word, with trivial adjust-
ments, from Klaas Ruitenbeek, Carpentry and Building in Late Imperial China
(Leiden, 1993)—again no acknowledgement, no listing in the bibliography.
The volume under review concludes from this quotation that "throughout tra-
ditional Chinese history it would be profoundly uncongenial to separate out the
technological from the religious-folkloric aspects of traditional Chinese archi-
tecture." It then takes a bold jump, asserting "that the rhetorical conventions of
Classical Chinese, the literary traditionalism of Chinese prose, might stand in the
way of the development of science and technology in China." Yes, it might; but
did it? It would not be difficult, after all, to gauge its magnitude as a stumbling-
block by looking into, say, the oft-studied Ying-tsao fa shih     (1097).
I would conclude from that and other books on architectural standards that the
extent of "religious-folkloric aspects" in a given text will depend on who wrote it
and for what purpose.
The writers of technological prose in China were usually officials, rarely
craftsmen. To the extent that they understood what they described, they were
able to describe what they saw. It is an elementary fallacy to imagine that the
linguistic prejudices or mental habits of pedants or even elite enthusiasts deter-
mine technical innovation. What craftsmen in different social groupings be-
lieved, and how they integrated their beliefs with their work, are empirical ques-
tions. Again the author does not raise them.
Analogously, intellectual historians have known for some time that the preju-
dice of some literati against the study of nature did not prevent the maturation of
sciences (not just technologies) as sophisticated as their pre-modern European
counterparts. It did not even prevent Ming governments from adding substantial
technical questions on mathematical astronomy and medicine to the metropolitan
examinations, forcing every aspiring civil servant to learn these fields, as
Benjamin Elman has just demonstrated in A Cultural History of Civil Examina-
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tions in Late Imperial China. Anyone today who is unwilling to learn them is ill
equipped to form global generalizations.
We would expect anyone who asserts that "from the -4th century onwards we
find an almost totally unornate, unallusive hard-headed scientific style in China"
to cite evidence from a range of scientific books. This volume of nearly five
hundred pages does not cite a single book devoted to science or technology. Its
sole recourse to the medical literature is a two-graph quotation from the first
chapter of the Huang-ti nei ching Su wen       (p. 222). Some very
important monographs, both before A.D. 100 and after, are highly ornate and
allusive. One would not have to read many chapters of the Su wen to discover
that it is one of them. What "hard-headed" means I have no idea.
These sentiments about science, either stale or mysterious, form a consistent
pattern. When the book judges that "in scientific texts, for example, we often
find a strong tendency towards rhythmic regularity, which leads to uncertainty
whether certain characters are heavily significant or purely euphonic and present
only for the sake of rhythm" (p. 106), the only example given is the Buddhist
logical texts. I do not find this rhythmic tendency frequent in books on the vari-
ous natural sciences and medicine, although if the author had been curious he
could have shown, citing rhymed mathematical and medical textbooks for nov-
ices, that it is not altogether unknown.
Strange indeed! I can only speculate that this pattern—a compulsion to tell
readers what the history of science is about while maintaining a pristine igno-
rance of its sources—is a throwback to the Sinology of the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, in which a command of the classical language and of
philological method entitled one to pronounce ex cathedra on any aspect of Chi-
nese culture. Harbsmeier harshly reprimands Hansen, Marcel Granet (pp. 22-24),
and others for exactly that sense of entitlement.
Unwillingness to follow one's chosen questions where they lead—the Awe-
some Taboo—detracts from what would otherwise have been a generally admi-
rable book. When Harbsmeier decides to analyze "logical argumentation (as
opposed to correlative explanation)" (p. 265, my emphasis), he rules out an ade-
quate account of the language and logic of scientific writing, much of which
depends on inseparable causal and correlative relations.
The last three sentences of the book rest in the primary sources: "One needs
to be familiar with the ancient traditions and texts one wishes to compare. It is as
simple as that. And it is as difficult as that" (p. 420). The word "wishes" is cru-
cial. It would be unfair to fault this book for something the author does not want
to do. But despite his lack of scholarly curiosity about science, he chooses nev-
ertheless to make many historical judgments about its connections with lan-
guage. It would be an epoch-making step to analyze the documents of science
themselves, to excavate their patterns of language use, the semantics and the
non-semantic logic embedded in them, to identify the motivations and interests
of their authors, and to assess the outcome. Such a project would answer the
crucial empirical question that this volume leaves not merely unanswered but
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unexamined: whether the pre-Han classics played an important role, not
notionally but actually, in forming the limits, if any, of technical discourse. Still,
this volume is a highly meritorious work of conventional but ingenious
philology. Every reader will learn from it, and that is occasion for gratitude.
